So it secured the “Normal” login interface.Īnyone can steal the vault from the back-end provider, and then they have an infinite amount of time to decrypt it by brute force methods.Īm I right to think that this “infinite time to decrypt if stolen” is the same level of risk for 1Password’s vaults or Bitwarden’s vaults? I guess, in Lastpass, Yubikey was only used as a 2FA for the login process. Heck with lastpass and using a yubikey - the thieves still obtained our vaults. I'm a 'Mac+iOS+Windows+Yubikey household' But YMMV with a customer service answer.įYI with Bitwarden you can set it to either lock the vault with just the master password required or do a full logout with whatever 2fa you have set. I queried their customer support folks and they got back to me and said no. Your concern was one of several reasons why I abandoned their product and went with Bitwarden. When I left Lastpass I first tried 1Password.
Is there a way to enforce this as a rule w 1password? It offered a certain protection level from devices inadvertently left behind, or if stolen during extended trips. One of the security measures of Lastpass that I liked was the ability to require Yubikey EVERYTIME I logged in to the vault. Much more polished and I find tags to be helpful instead of folders/single category. I like the 1Password UI much more than LastPass. Their app also supports biometric unlocking on the platforms that you mentioned. After that it’s just master password to unlock the vault. Seems to be this way because 1Password generates a long secret key that is also required with the master password to setup a new device. Their 2FA is different than LastPass in that it’s only required when setting up a new device. What’s the best alternative password manager for a Mac+iOS+Windows environment with Yubikey only access?ġPassword supports Yubikey or TOTP for 2FA. What are your reasons for not having migrated from Lastpass yet?
0 kommentar(er)
